

Party Organizer



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Results

Vol. VI.

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PARTY ORGANIZER

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Some Mistakes in Applying the United Front Tactic

The increase in the sentiment of the masses for united struggle has its roots in the objective situation—the deepening of the crisis and the measures sponsored by Roosevelt for a way out through placing still greater burdens on the masses (economy measures, increased militarization, measures against unions, increased terror, preparations for a new war now sensed by the masses, etc.). Together with this there has been the application of the united front tactic with greater boldness by the Communist Party on the basis of the united front manifesto of the Communist International.

The road to the further development of broad united front struggles is the energetic taking up of *the day to day needs* of the workers as they are affected by Roosevelt's hunger and war program and there, in connection with these most vital issues, exposing the reactionary role of the reformist misleaders. This point must be emphasized: *There are no issues which are more favorable to the development of mass struggles on a united front basis than these issues which daily affect the lives of all toilers*—the workers and farmers, Negro and white.

The Mooney issue, Scottsboro, May Day and similar issues can often serve to set the masses in motion, bringing them possibly for the first time in contact with Communist leadership, but these actions will only serve their purpose and result in the greatest benefit to the workers, if they result in bringing the masses into struggle around the vital economic and political issues that daily confront the toilers as a whole. In other words in our further efforts to develop mass struggles the *first consideration must be given to strengthening the work in the factories, in the trade unions and among the unemployed*. Here is where the broadest united front can be set up and here the class-collaboration policies of the reformist leaders *on all questions* can be most effectively exposed to the masses. United front actions on other specific issues must serve to draw the masses into these most basic struggles.

While, in the main, the united front tactic has been applied correctly by the Party, thereby forcing the issue of *a united front of struggle* into a central position in the whole working class movement, there have been numerous and serious shortcomings, and also

dangerous opportunist errors. These shortcomings and errors—both the right and “left” varieties, as well as the Party’s deep-rooted sectarian tendencies, have seriously hampered the Party in its efforts to take the fullest possible advantage of the present favorable opportunities to create a great mass workers’ movement.

The sectarian tendencies—the chief *obstacle* to successful mass work—have shown themselves most clearly in a more or less openly expressed resistance to the united front, on one hand, and in an ill-concealed tendency to get out of any united front at the earliest opportunity, on the other. One frequently hears a sigh of relief after an action is finished; the comrades afflicted with these tendencies are always glad to crawl back into the quiet solitude of their own sectarian shells. In this connection a rigid formalism sometimes serves to conceal (possibly even from the offenders) the sectarian essence of their actions.

Sectarian Tendencies in Application of United Front

In one district, for example, a Socialist branch, convinced of the need for joint struggle, took the initiative in proposing united action to the Communist unit in its locality. Our unit correctly favored accepting this proposal, and wanted to confer with the Socialist branch on the common struggles to be undertaken. But the District Bureau decided, *No*. The Central Committee in its united front directives, they pointed out, had instructed the Communist bodies “to take the initiative in approaching the lower Socialist Party bodies for joint struggle.” The District Bureau reasoned, therefore, that at all costs the “initiative” must be taken away from the Socialist local. They instructed the Communist unit “*to ignore the offer of the Socialist branch,*” and to send another offer of its own for united action “in order that we retain the initiative.” Obviously, the proletarian instincts of the unit members would have done more to give the Communists real initiative in the development of local struggles, than the rigid formalism of the District Bureau which would have made the unit the laughing stock of the workers.

In another district, one of the neighborhood reformist unemployed organizations invited the revolutionary unemployed council there to enter into joint struggle for more relief. The invitation was refused. The reformist local was informed, contrary to our policy, that “we want a united front only on a city-wide scale”—this at a time when we are fighting precisely against limiting our united front efforts to the upper committees of the reformist bodies.

Such examples could be cited from every district, and from

almost every section, in varied forms of course, to prove concretely the need for continuous efforts to clarify the Party comrades and to uproot this sectarian resistance to serious mass work.

Sectarian tendencies hamper us most in our efforts to enter into work among the masses on a united front basis, but when we have once entered into such activities the greatest danger arises from mistakes of an openly right opportunist character. Then, in our anxiety to set up a united front, there is the tendency to capitulate to the demands and maneuvers of the reformist leaders, thereby weakening the effectiveness of our efforts to expose these leaders and to destroy the illusions among the masses, created by these leaders, which are the principal barriers to a united front of struggle together with the Communists. In other words, in our over-anxiety to achieve united action, by our own capitulation to reformist influences, we make it more difficult for the masses to find the only road to effective joint struggle—the road which takes the masses over the political corpses of these leaders.

Right Opportunist Errors

Other mistakes of a right opportunist character have been made, and also from the failure to realize that *we desire a united front with the masses on the basis of energetic class struggles for their day to day needs*. Some comrades interpret our policy as one based on a desire for a united front of “tendencies,” of “organizations,” etc., when what we want is a united front of *the masses* regardless of tendencies or organizations. In the course of the united front struggles it is our aim to win the masses for *one* “tendency”—the revolutionary fighting policies of the Communist International, and for *one* Party—the Communist Party. *Win the masses*, this is our objective in the united front.

Some comrades have interpreted the manifesto of the Communist International as a “new policy” based on a united front with the *leaders*. But this is not correct as can be seen from the following excerpt from that manifesto:

“The Communist International, in view of fascism which is unchaining all the forces of world reaction against the working-class of Germany, calls upon all Communist Parties to make yet another attempt to set up the united front of struggle with *the Social-Democratic workers through the medium of the Social-Democratic Parties.*”

Here the Comintern policy is very clearly stated: “with the Social-Democratic workers *through the medium of the Social-Democratic Parties.*” What we want is “*the united front of struggle with the Social-Democratic workers*” (read also A. F. of L.,

C.P.L.A., and all other *workers*). This is our objective. All other questions such as "through the medium of the Social-Democratic Parties," etc., are only tactical questions, and should never be permitted to blur over a clear view of our objective in the development of the united front struggles. Above all, such confusion should never cause us to lose sight of the fundamental social-fascist character of the *leadership* of the reformist bodies. And they should not cause us to fall into the renegade chatter about a united front of "tendencies." These conceptions can only serve as brakes on the development of our mass work.

But these opportunist conceptions have influenced our mass work. In some cases the effort to set up the united front "through the medium of the Social-Democratic Parties" and other reformist bodies has caused us to neglect the basic task of winning the masses in the factories, in the trade unions, and at the relief bureaus. This reliance on appeals to *top committees* of the Socialist Party, of the A. F. of L., etc., manifested in some instances, can only be based on the misconception that these bodies, *as such*, will change their basically reformist character and adopt a policy of class struggle. This is a false outlook. As organizations they will remain social-fascist. If they come into the united front, even on a limited number of issues, it will be because they are forced in by the mass pressure for a united front of struggle. Waiting at the door steps then of the social-fascist leaders and neglecting the basic mass work would lead to failure all around. It will lead to a weakening of our efforts to win the masses for our policies. It will lead to a relaxation of the mass pressure on these leaders, thereby destroying even the faintest possibility that they would enter the united front. The main task, now as ever, is the work in the factories, in the unions and among the unemployed—*directly with the workers*. This is the way *a united front of struggle will be built*.

When the Communist International urges us "*to make yet another attempt*" to win the workers "*through the medium of*" the reformist organizations, it does not do so with the expectation that these reformist bodies (except of course the lower units) will enter a fighting united front. It makes this proposal in the sense of calling the bluff of the reformist leaders, with the viewpoint of exposing these treacherous misleaders as the opponents of united action, as the enemies of the workers. In this way, "through the medium of the Social-Democratic Parties" the masses will become convinced of the anti-working class character of these bodies and of their leadership. They will be won for the Communist policies, and for the Communist Party.

Establishing the Unity of the Unemployed Workers

IN THIS article we will relate some of the experiences in the application of one of the essential features of the United Front—the unification of separate groups of unorganized workers for joint struggle—in a small steel town in Ohio.

The population of the town is between four and five thousand, mostly steel workers. For years, although carrying on “mass work,” holding mass meetings, affairs, etc., the comrades here never succeeded in attracting the local workers.

When the question of holding an unemployed mass meeting was raised in the Masury unit, the unit made the following decisions: “That first they must go out and find out if workers were willing to attend such meetings, and if they did, then to call a meeting.”

In the meantime, in our search for new contacts, we made connection with one local worker who was considered by our comrades as a “reactionary,” who could not be trusted since he had voted the Democratic ticket in the last election, and still goes to church at times.” We spoke to this worker and asked him if he was willing to cooperate with us in building the Unemployed Council. He expressed willingness to help, stating: “I myself am an unemployed worker, and am desirous of improving my conditions.”

Township Committee Elected

Within two days he brought seventy workers to a meeting. At this meeting we explained the aim and purpose of the Unemployed Council, and the local conditions of the unemployed. Many of the workers present took part in the discussion and enthusiastically endorsed the idea of building up an organization of the unemployed. A committee of eleven was elected to be known as the Brookfield Township Unemployed Committee. The date for the next general meeting was decided. The committee was given the job to go out and investigate the cases of those who had been denied relief, etc., and to bring back a report.

Discuss Immediate Demands

At the meeting the following week there were over one hundred workers present. The committee made its report. After the discussion following the report the following concrete demands were worked out:

A half-pound of meat per person per week.
Six fresh eggs for each child up to the age of six.
Hot lunches in the schools for the children.
Separate days for the distribution of the food for the different sections within the township, etc.

A Committee of fifteen was elected to present these demands to the township trustees' meeting, which was to take place within three days after our meeting. In addition to the committee about fifty people, among whom were some local storekeepers and farmers, but mainly workers, attended the meeting. At first the floor was refused to our committee, but at the insistence of the committee the floor was given to the spokesman of the committee, whose speech created a real sentiment among those present—even among those opposed to the committee being granted the floor.

One of the trustees, a typical Pinchot type, sensing the sentiment of those present, took the floor and placed the blame for the existing bad distribution of relief, on the chairman of the trustee who was a Republican. We quite skillfully utilized this demagoguery on her part and further provoked sharper exposure of themselves.

Win Demands and Extend Influence

After a lengthy discussion they promised to fulfill our demands. The news spread outside the township like lighting and at our next regular meeting over two hundred workers were present. At this meeting over seventy workers were involved on various committees such as, a committee to go to the special meeting to be held by the trustees where a "noted" speaker invited by the Commissioners was to speak on the relief question; another committee was to go to see the school board to permit the unemployed to hold a meeting in one of the school auditoriums; still another committee to visit the Trumbull County commissioners about water and gas question.

The following week at a meeting at one of the school auditoriums we had over eight hundred workers present.

Today we have about two hundred workers coming to all our weekly meetings of the Unemployed Council, and the influence of the Council extends to about seven or eight hundred workers.

How Forces Were Developed

It is quite significant to note how we tried to solve the question of forces in the Unemployed Council. We have no Party members to take a leading part in the work. Most of the workers

are participating in a class struggle organization for the first time. The only medium through which we had to work was the Executive Committee of the Unemployed Council, which consisted of all non-Party members, who belonged to different organizations such as, the Democratic Party, Republican Party, some belonging to church organizations and so on. Only one on the executive committee had any previous connections with us. We had to apply the tactics of boldly pushing to the forefront, and strengthening honest, energetic non-Party elements, developing them into real leading cadres. To accomplish this we concentrated on a few, sending them to various conferences, electing them to committees, sending them to bring their reports to other workers in the nearby vicinity.

The workers seeing our daily contacts with them, our confidence in their ability, pushing them forward and trusting them with various tasks, not only accepted our leadership, but came to us to seek information, consulting us on the various duties such as how to outline their speeches, etc.

Today we have an active cadre of workers, who only yesterday were local leading elements in the Democratic, Republican and other similar organizations. One of these workers held a position in the Democratic Party, being the secretary of the local party. Today he is one of our most outstanding leaders of the Unemployed Council, daily coming into closer contact with the revolutionary movement.

This experience brings out very clearly that the test of Communist leadership in the United Front consists precisely of our ability to draw in and develop non-Party cadres, who will accept the guidance and leadership of the Communist workers in the particular movement.

—OLGA MASON

Greater Tempo Needed in Party Recruiting

OUR Party membership is now about twenty thousand. This is the largest membership since the formation of the Party except for a brief period between the split in the Socialist Party in 1919 and the driving of the Party underground. But the quality of the membership is much higher today. At that time the bulk of the membership consisted of the language federations. These workers are now identified with the various mass organizations sympathetic to the Party. Only the genuine Communist elements that

stood the test of the Bolshevization and reorganization of the Party remained members of the reorganized Party. The membership today is greater than at the time of the reorganization of the Party eight years ago. Since that time the membership hovered around the 10,000 mark. This was even true as late as a year ago. Today the membership of the Party, however, is definitely around twenty thousand. This is a big achievement for the Party. It reflects the growing radicalization of the masses and the growing activity of the Party in the leadership of the struggles of the masses.

This membership of 20,000 does not by any means correspond to the tremendous increase in the radicalization of the masses and the influence of the Party as a consequence of its activity. The Party still lags far behind. When we consider that in the city of New York alone 120,000 workers demonstrated on May First under the auspices of the United Front May Day Committee in which the Communists were the most influential as well as the strongest and decisive forces, and compare this with the membership of about 4,500, then we can clearly see this lagging behind. When we bear in mind that the T.U.U.L. unions in New York have a membership upwards of 25,000, that the fraternal organizations contain additional tens of thousands of members, that the influence of the Party in the A. F. of L. unions is today stronger than ever before, then we must ask ourselves why the membership of the Party does not grow faster. The situation in New York City is duplicated in Detroit, Chicago, and in almost every other city. The influence of the Party is growing at a faster pace than the membership of the Party.

Recruiting Not Yet a Systematic Task

Even a very casual analysis will disclose that the Party does not as yet make recruiting a serious and systematic day-to-day activity. This is especially emphasized if we study the specific struggles in which the Party played an important role. Let us take the recent struggles of the unemployed and the National Hunger March. Hundreds of thousands of workers not only unemployed but employed as well, were reached through the preparations and the carrying through of the hunger march. Many workers read about this action and were sympathetic. But the number recruited into the Party was very small. The recruitment in this period was almost the same as for any other period. Very often, even the reverse takes place. When the Party is engaged in big mass actions, the recruitment falls off. This is due in the main to a neglect of

the organizational activity of the Party, except that which is immediately bound up with the most routine carrying thru of the given actions. In strike struggles, this weakness is even more pronounced. In the Chicago District for example, in the course of the months of struggle in the mining fields in the last year there was very little increase in the Party membership. Almost the same is the case with regard to the important and in the main successful strike struggles of the auto workers in Detroit. The fight for the freedom of Mooney and for the Scottsboro boys is another illustration.

Independent Role of Party

What is the reason for this? Surely there can be no argument that in the course of such struggles the workers are not more ready than ever to learn about our Party and to become part of it. No one will even dare bring forward such arguments. Where then do we find the cause? It lies in the fact that in the first place the Party as a Party does not come forward independently and show to the masses who are in struggle, how they can strengthen their fighting capacity by building the Communist Party. We are afraid to come to the masses and openly explain to them the role of the Party in the struggle. Our comrades hide the face of the Party. Their own conception of the Party as a selected sect keeps them from bringing the Party forward for fear that through this, the struggle will be hurt. But this false position is in reality an expression of the right sectarianism which is so deeply rooted in the Party.

What is the result? Our enemies attack the Party. They give to the masses a distorted picture of our Party. We through our failure to bring forward boldly the position of the Party help to maintain this distorted picture. The difficulty here arises also from the conception that the Party can come to the workers only with "high politics" while it is the business of the unions to take up the every-day struggle. This social democratic division between trade union work and Party work fails to consider that the Party must come to the masses not to replace the unions but nevertheless as the organization which leads them in the every-day struggles, which through its superior tactics, knowledge and guidance brings them to the realization of the correctness of the Party line in the immediate struggle as well as the need to struggle for the abolition of capitalism. In such a manner we convince them of the necessity of not only following but building their Party—the Communist Party.

Furthermore, even the workers who already are convinced of

the correctness of the position of the Party are kept out of the Party for fear that they are not wanted, or because they believe the requirements are so great that they will not make the grade; of that it requires giving up everything they now cherish, family, jobs, and religion in order to be eligible to join the Party. They have received not only through our enemies but even through us a distorted picture of Party discipline. We ourselves through our sectarian approach frighten away excellent proletarian elements from joining the Party.

Poor Life and Work of Party Cause of Fluctuation

Next we must look to the tremendous turnover in the Party. Tens of thousands of workers in the course of the last few years joined and left the Party. This is not due to the bad composition of the new recruits. This may account for only a very small number. The main cause is the life and work of the Party, especially the lower organizations. Here we see the fruits of the sectarian life of the Party organizations and the mass of the Party membership. Here we have the fruits of the separations of the Party work and trade union work.

How shall we solve this question? In the first place it is necessary to not only involve the Party membership and the Party organizations in mass work, but bring forward clearly the independent role of the Party. It is necessary to develop more extensive agitation and propaganda in connection with every struggle. We must consider every struggle that does not result in the raising in the political level of the workers and the building of the Party as not a success, even though the immediate demands may be won. *Building the Party must be a necessary counterpart of every struggle.* This must be deeply ingrained into the consciousness of every Party member and every Party organization. Recruitment cannot be left to chance. The recruitment must be well planned and prepared ideologically and organizationally.

Next, it is necessary to give the most serious attention to the work of the lower organizations. To reduce the routine work to a minimum and to justify the expectations of the new members as to what they think the Party is and should be.

It is necessary to explain to the masses the program of the Party, its form of organization, the requirements of the members, the kind of discipline and reasons for it. It is necessary to make the workers feel that we are not a sect; that we want them to join; that it is not our Party but also their Party.

In connection with the problem of fluctuation we can not

stress too much the necessity of always keeping the members in good standing. Looseness on this question inevitably leads to a shaking of the ties to the Party. Recently one of the reasons for the increase in membership was due to more attention to the payment of dues. But this question is far from being solved. There are even indications of falling back to the old neglect of this question in some of the Party organizations.

The possibilities for building the Party were never greater. Are we going to take advantage of them? If we don't we will not only not grow, but will be unable to meet the growing tasks placed upon us. If we do take advantage of the possibilities we are in a position to double our membership in the course of the next months.

J. S.

Party Grows in Strike Struggle

AT THE time the Protective Shoe Workers Union began preparations for the strike of the seven thousand shoe workers of Haverhill, Mass., we had a unit of five members in this town. The unit was then active in establishing contact with workers in the shoe factories. Three weeks before the strike began we succeeded in organizing a group of 15 workers, all from one factory.

Before we met with this group to take up plans of action during the strike, we discussed our policy to be followed, at a special unit meeting, with a representative of the leading fraction of the revolutionary Shoe Workers Industrial Union, who had previously taken up the strike situation with the Party District. A meeting of the group was then held at which a thorough discussion was held of the demands to be proposed, role of the reformist leaders and role of the opposition group.

We agreed to put up the following three main demands: 1) a definite increase in wages, amounting in some cases to 15 per cent and in others 20 per cent, as against the general talk of increase by the reformist leaders; 2) for the election of a rank and file strike committee, and strike committees in each shop; 3) for mass picketing of all shops.

In addition to this the group meeting made arrangements to issue a leaflet, selected spokesmen for the first meeting of the strikers, organized a defense group to defend our speakers, subdivided itself to mingle with various groups of workers, and also made arrangements to meet daily during the strike, each day in a different place.

At the first meeting of the strikers the reformist leaders attempted to get a free hand to sell out the strike. They proposed that the strikers go back to work and the question of an increase be left in their hands to negotiate with the bosses. Our group succeeded in defeating this by putting up a counter proposal that the strike shall go on and that all negotiations with the bosses should be held only by a committee elected by the strikers themselves, that will be responsible to the strikers. This was overwhelmingly endorsed by the strikers.

While mingling with the strikers our comrades noticed that some workers react more favorably to some of our demands, while other workers react more favorably to other demands. We therefore organized small meetings of strikers around various demands as they reacted to them. This way we succeeded to broaden the base of the group and win wider support for all demands.

As the strike developed, thanks to our activity, we built up our group from 15 to 90 members, organized on a concrete program of struggle. We also began recruiting the more advanced into the Party. At an open unit meeting held during the strike seven new members joined the Party and at the time of the end of the strike a group of 15 young workers were being organized into a unit of the Young Communist League.

Our activity during the strike, although failing to prevent the reformists from selling out, did succeed to force some gains for the workers in the form of raising the wages of the lower paid workers to the level of the highest paid factory workers in the town.

After the strike was over we organized our group on the basis of their craft to continue the work started. The group is also carrying on educational activity among the workers, issuing a bulletin and carrying on classes in strike strategy and in trade unionism.

How a Unit Analyzed and Improved Its Work

UNIT 2, Section 10 was a territorial Unit which included Long Island City, Woodside, Jackson Heights, Corona, Flushing, College Point and Bayside. On record, we had nineteen members. The attendance at Unit meetings varied from twelve to as low as seven.

At the meetings, the Unit would discuss directives from the Section and District, make assignments and there would be a discussion on whatever topic the Section would assign. Meetings

started late and lasted long. There were efforts to sell the *Daily Worker*, organize an Unemployed Council and concentration on a shop. But the reports from these committees were very unsatisfactory. The *Daily Worker* Agent had the usual complaint that comrades don't call for their bundles and that the *D. W.* is stacking up. The Shop Committee did not seem to be getting anywhere. The Committee for unemployed work was groping in the dark, working hard, but getting nowhere. The Unit Buro was not functioning regularly nor properly.

Discuss Reasons for Inactivity

As a result, the spirit of the Unit was low, enthusiasm was lacking, discipline was very lax. Unit 2 was another one of those Units which was going around in a circle getting nowhere. Finally we decided at one of the meetings that we have the subject of the discussion the Unit itself. "What is wrong and how can the Unit improve its work?" This discussion proved to be the turning point of the Unit. The discussion brought out the following facts:

1. That the Unit was not acquainted with its own territory.
2. That we were not part of the life of the workers in our territory.
3. That there was entirely too much laxity.
4. That we were very mechanical in our efforts.
5. That there was no plan.
6. That our political discussions were abstract and were in the main disconnected from the work we were trying to do. No efforts were made to concretely apply the lessons of the discussion to our work.

We were doing no work in the very neighborhood in which the comrades lived.

Take the First Steps to Overcome Weaknesses

On the basis of this analysis we decided to take action at once and to reorganize the Buro by electing the best comrades for leadership in the Unit. This was done.

The Buro at its first meeting took up the following subjects:

1. Drafting a one month's plan of work.
2. Organization of the Unit on the group basis.
3. Registration of the available time for Unit work by each member.
4. Meetings to start not later than 8:15 and adjourn not later than 10:45 P. M.
5. Assignment of tasks to each and every comrade according to time available.
6. Strict enforcement of the rule that no one is exempt from

Unit work. Comrades assigned to mass organizations to give at least one night to Unit assignments.

7. Strict check up.

8. Unit organizer to meet with committee to show them how to carry out their work and train them for leadership in their particular task.

9. Thorough study of our territory and its problems.

10. Concentration upon one shop and one neighborhood

These questions were discussed by the Buro and the Unit and when adopted the Buro began to carry them into effect.

Discuss Plans of Work

We drafted the following plan of work for one month:

1. To increase membership by 10.

2. To secure new *Daily Worker* readers.

3. To build one more International Labor Defense branch.

4. To organize one Unemployed Council.

5 To organize a Women's Council.

6. To organize a shop committee.

7. To register 90 per cent attendance.

8. To register 90 per cent dues payments

9. To have 5 functioning groups.

Unit Grows in Members and Influence

We elected committees for the various tasks. Other comrades were assigned to the Buro.

In getting new members, we began to show our members how to select and concentrate upon the most promising comrades in the International Labor Defense; how to search out, approach and contact workers at open air meetings and affairs; how to approach and propagandise friends and acquaintances. This was done by personal conversation with the comrades. The result was that we have recruited not ten but 16 new members among whom was one Negro woman worker, the first Negro to join the party in the whole section. This process of recruiting continues. Seven weeks after the plan was introduced, 41 comrades attended the Unit meeting and the Unit is now divided in two.

The Committee in charge of the *Daily Worker* secured 30 new readers through personal canvassing of the International Labor Defense members and their friends. The paper is delivered to their doors.

The building of another I. L. D. branch was assigned to the I. L. D. fraction comrades, who were instructed to involve the existing I. L. D. branch in this task. The Negro territory of

Corona was previously selected by the I. L. D. and this was also made our concentration point. The I. L. D. arranged a Scottsboro mass meeting jointly with the local of the National Association for the Advancement of the Colored People in a church. A Scottsboro Defense Committee later developed out of this meeting. This Committee then gave a dance. The I. L. D. was popularized and the Committee soon turned into an I. L. D. branch which now has 125 members mostly Negroes (5 have since joined the Party in the new Unit.)

Decide on Developing Struggle for Lower Rents

The question of unemployed work was one that gave the unit the most trouble. One comrade has been making desperate efforts long before in this work without success. The Committee given this responsibility, now met to decide what can be done. It analyzed the local situation very carefully which brought out the following facts:

1. That within the last two years there has been only one actual eviction.

2. That bourgeois ideas are widespread in the ranks of the workers, that they will not openly acknowledge their suffering.

3. That 56 per cent of the population is a home owning people of the white collar workers and others who have made fairly high wages at one time.

4. That unemployment is not as prevalent as in other parts of the country, but wage cuts have effected the workers very seriously. On the basis of this analysis we decided that what is actually needed at once is a struggle for lower rents and in behalf of the worker-home-owner who was in great danger of losing his home. It was just about this time that we have first learned about the already existing Sunnyside home owners association which has since created so much publicity in the press and which is under the leadership of the mortgage concerns which are using these home-owners in trying to get the government to guarantee the mortgages to them. Because the work was new and correct policies had to be worked out, plans had to be formulated and comrades had to be trained, we have not succeeded to organize the home-owners nor the tenants in the time allotted, but a good start was made.

We have failed to organize the Women's Council.

We have failed to organize the shop committee because of lack of experience, but we have made quite a number of contacts who are already convinced of the necessity to organize.

Our dues payments and attendance has reached 80 per cent.

Party Members Work With Enthusiasm

Although the plan has failed in some respects, we have accomplished more than our quota in some, but the morale of the comrades has been raised tremendously and the results have inspired them to much bigger aims.

The discipline of the comrades has been raised greatly, not through bureaucratic orders or punishment, but through political explanation of the importance of the tasks assigned, consideration for each comrade and his abilities, understanding and development, and through very close check up on work given out. The Unit Buro has before it at all times when members are available and thus assignments are made to fit-in with the comrade's time. Sunday is set aside as a day of relaxation or for very special work. One evening a week of study is compulsory.

At no time is an assignment made unless the comrade has a clear understanding of why he is to do the work and how to do it. The organizer meets with the committees that need this information until the committee is able to proceed by itself.

What Unit 2 has done can be done by any other unit. Plan your work, understand the political content of your tasks, know the methods to be used, practice proletarian discipline and proletarian democracy, analyze shortcomings, popularize achievements, create responsibility, enthusiasm and self-confidence within each comrade. These shall be uppermost before the Unit Buros and the Units can become the leaders of the toiling masses within their spheres of operation.

Shop Work Still Lags Behind

The main shortcomings of the Unit are that we have failed to materialize sufficiently in the most important tasks of the plan—shop work and the tenants' committee, and there has been insufficient mass work. While the Unit has been holding open air meetings and was doing considerable work in the Scottsboro case, we have not yet developed local struggles. In the next plan of work, the Buro should concentrate upon final realization of a shop committee and a tenants' committee, and at the same time develop struggles of the tenants, small home owners and in the shop upon which we are concentrating.

M. STEIN

Overcoming Sectarianism

OUR comrades in Kansas City have in the past developed a theory of exceptionalism. They said: "You might be able to rally workers and build organizations in other cities, but not in Kansas." Now, however, as a result of successful activities, this theory is losing ground. Here's an example.

We have a small unit of seven members in the north end of Kansas City, Kansas. Most of the members are Negro workers. We have often taken up with this unit methods of reaching the Negroes with the Scottsboro case, suggesting as one of the means the visiting of Negro churches to speak on the case. Our comrades always replied that we could not speak in Kansas City Negro churches because the Negro preachers were reactionary and well paid by the packing house bosses to keep their members in subjection, and that the workers were afraid to go against them.

However, the comrades decided to call a meeting in the Negro neighborhood and to utilize the meeting to build a Scottsboro Club. The meeting was very successful and a number of workers signed up for the club. A meeting of all who signed up was then held and the club was properly organized and a regular meeting night agreed upon. Among the members of the club and in its leadership there were workers belonging to the Non-Partisan League and to the local Democratic Clubs. These workers have also contact with various churches and church and fraternal organizations. Through them we succeeded to speak in the biggest and most influential Negro churches and get the support of the congregations for the Scottsboro campaign. Even the preachers of these churches were forced to come out in favor of the Scottsboro fight.

As a result of this activity we now have two Scottsboro Clubs and a third is in the process of being organized. Our comrades are finally convinced that the workers are willing and ready to fight for their needs.

Upon investigation, we found that our comrades had never really tried to speak in the Negro churches before. They had simply built up the idea that it was impossible but now we see that they are getting on the job and are making appointments to speak in other Negro churches.

This experience shows that our comrades did not have faith in the masses, they seemed to think that the Communist program is good for Communists, but that workers in general do not care for our program. It further shows that workers, regardless of

what political party they may follow at present, are willing to fight in behalf of the Scottsboro boys; and that they have enthusiasm and initiative.

The unit is now taking up the question of building the Party, of recruiting the best elements in these clubs for the Party so that we can continue to grow and to guide these organizations in the proper channels. Our comrades had meetings last year among the unemployed in this same neighborhood, but they failed to build the Party and develop local leadership, and as soon as the police attack came, the organizations were smashed completely. Our comrades blamed the workers and called them cowards instead of blaming it upon the Party members who failed to prepare the organizations for struggle.

K. E.

More Leadership in the Struggle for Unemployment Insurance

THE capitalist class led by the Roosevelt government is trying to create the impression that employment is on the upgrade and that unemployment is passing away. Continual reports in the capitalist papers about the hiring of new men and of wage increases (published with the clear intention of having the workers forget the starvation wages they have received in the past three years and of keeping them from struggle cannot offset the fact that relief agencies point out the increasing number of those on the relief rolls and the diminishing amount of relief. The relief directors also admit that the *situation during the coming winter will be more severe than before.*

The industrial "recovery" bill, which will have been enacted into law before this is published, involving an expenditure of \$3,300,000,000 over a period of two years, also aims to blind the workers to the actual situation. *Wages, hours and conditions of work will be determined by a control board—which means forced labor on a large scale.*

While the capitalists are ballyhooing about returning prosperity, let us not forget what Roosevelt said a few months ago: "If we should return to the peak production of 1929, from 5 to 10 million workers will not go back to work." While the capitalist point to the increased production in the steel industry, let us quote the N. Y. Times of May 25, 1933: "*The producers themselves are in a somewhat incredulous frame of mind; they do not know whether the*

upturn has behind it the force needed for a permanent improvement."

With steel production up to 38 per cent; with auto production and building construction mounting; with power output increasing, one would be blind to state that there is no change. But is this production for *use*? A glance at the car loadings will show clearly that it is not,—*it is for stock*. Taking advantage of the low prices and fear the rising prices, the manufacturers are turning out material for stock. Some more workers have gone back to work at miserable wages: soon again the stocks will be built up and these workers will be fired. There are no markets for production, neither domestic or foreign—and therefore the basis for the renewed production is the laying in of stock.

In this situation, with diminishing funds for relief; with complaints of the big taxpayers against the rates; with the bankers demanding "economy" and dictating terms; with the U. S. government appropriating a measly \$500,000,000 for unemployment relief, on the basis of \$250,000,000 being available to the states and cities provided they raise \$2 for each dollar they obtain from the federal government; with the number of applicants (not recipients) for relief increasing; what is doing in the unemployed movement?

Everywhere there is a cut in relief. Everywhere they are trying to substitute food tickets and commissary for cash relief. A wave of evictions is crossing the country. There were sentimental and economical reasons for not carrying on wholesale evictions during the winter months, but now they are beginning on a very large scale, as for instance in New York, where the city administration is refusing to pay any rents.

In face of this situation, with an admitted 17,000,000 unemployed, with conditions progressively becoming worse for the masses of unemployed and part-time workers—and for large sections of the full time workers—it must be stated that our Party work is *very deficient*. The main shortcomings are:

1. Failure of the Districts to explain the situation and lack of belief of the Party members in the Party position that *large-scale unemployment is a permanent phenomenon*; that conditions are not improving; that the municipalities *can* be compelled to furnish more adequate relief—that real Unemployment Insurance can be secured.

2. Consequently, inability of our Party members to explain to and convince the workers of the possibility of obtaining proper relief and unemployment insurance. A consequent acceptance of

vast masses of the workers of the conditions of pauperism in which they are living.

3. Lack of attention of the Districts to the proper orientation of the Party fraction in the Unemployed Councils; little heed to organizational problems; little effort to put the Unemployed Councils on the *committee* basis (block, neighborhood, ward, flophouse, forced labor project, etc.) Building up neighborhood councils, as delegated bodies.

4. No effort made to penetrate the A. F. of L. unions (leaving this task to the A. F. of L. Committee for Unemployment Insurance).

5. Not even a start in raising the question in the mass American fraternal and mutual aid organizations, which have a membership of 26,000,000, which are losing their members because of unemployment, and in which the question of unemployment relief and insurance can be made live issues. Work only in "our" organizations.

6. Failure to make the revolutionary unions the initiators of unemployed work, although every Party member in the unions accepts the Prague resolution. (In Youngstown a correct theory, but wrong application—the Union to organize the employed, the Unemployed Council the unemployed!)

7. Little attention to the young workers, and relief for single workers. (In St. Louis, the organizer of a branch, in which there are some live Italian boys, wished to throw them out for their "monkey business," because they also wanted sports!)

8. No struggle around the special grievances of the Negro workers: discrimination in relief, work relief, etc. Failure in Chicago to note that on the Southside, the Negro and white workers were compelled to line up separately at the relief buros, with the result that there is a serious weakening of support among the Negro workers.

9. The Districts appoint and remove functionaries of the Unemployed Councils, without any regard to the democratic rights of the workers. (If a Party member is needed for other work, he is simply instructed to resign from the Unemployed Council and another comrade is put in his place, even if he has not participated in the unemployed work.)

10. Little effort to develop new forces, and to put non-party elements into leadership that have come out of the struggle and have the confidence of the workers.

11. No systematic education of the workers; little or no social and cultural life in the blocks and councils.

12. A tendency to demonstrative actions, instead of steady, hard

work in the neighborhoods, building up organization and conducting concrete struggle.

13. Finally and *most important of all*, the units of the Party in few instances are responsible for unemployed work, but assign a few members to do unemployed work in a most haphazard manner.

Of few of the Districts covered in my recent tour can it be said that the District Committees are giving proper attention to the unemployed work. During the recent hunger march in Illinois—a tremendous undertaking—the District left the matter to the Unemployed Council, with the result that there were outstanding weaknesses. In Ohio, the Unemployed work is very weak, the District paying attention because of the contemplated state hunger march. In Detroit, the District Committee has allowed the work to slump—even in Detroit itself, with little outside. In Pittsburgh, the situation is much better, but with the metal workers union only now getting a proper position on its role in unemployed work. Surely it has taken a long time! In Buffalo, little attention, with our influence among the Negroes quite low. In Boston, only now a slight awakening to the needs of the situation.

Altogether, it is imperative that the Districts put unemployed work on the order of business and that it be made a matter of *regular discussion, review and check-up*. The situation of the workers demands it. The moves of the united front and for unity make it imperative. But above all, our Party must become conscious of the fact that unemployment is a permanent phenomenon today and no zigzag course of industrial production will eliminate it. The struggle for Unemployment Insurance is the immediate issue. It must be made clear to the Party members first of all. The workers are willing to fight, as the innumerable struggles led by all Unemployed Councils testify. We have only a small fraction of the unemployed and part-time workers involved in struggle. We are not building the unions on the basis also of the unemployed struggles. The Prague and Central Committee resolutions must be read and studied again, and be popularized among the membership and the workers at large.

I. AMTER

Experiences of a Farm Unit

FOR more than six months the Party unit here was looking around for something to do. A farm unit in a small locality in Upper Michigan, composed of farmers in summer and lumber-workers (chopping pulp-wood) in winter, has quite a problem to function as a real Bolshevik Party unit. Until recently most of the activity was around the Cooperative and the struggle against the Halonenites.

How to draw all the poor workers and farmers away from the renegade-controlled store was the problem of the Party. And we found the "key" to be in the fact that the right-wing co-ops do not fight for the interests of the farmers, especially against foreclosures.

Winning Rank and File in Struggle Against Foreclosures

Over 60 farmers in Maple Ridge Township were facing foreclosures on their farms. We issued leaflets calling upon the farmers to come to a mass meeting to stop the foreclosure of N——'s farm. 300 farmers, including the sheriff, came. The sheriff was exposed. The farmers booed him when he tried to explain that he is the farmers' friend. We took up the question of getting the farmers to the County seat at the time of the sale. The school board members were present and evaded the issue of allowing the use of the school buses to transport the farmers, under the excuse that the state helps to finance it. This fell flat. A committee of 22 was selected to organize the march. The majority on the committee were poor farmers with many of Halonen's supporters since at least 150 of the 300 at the meeting were followers of the renegade. But all on the committee were ready to fight against the foreclosure.

School Strike Decided Upon

At the Party fraction meeting before the Farmers Committee of Action meeting, we took up the question of extending and broadening out the struggle. It was then decided to call a School strike. With the help of the Y. C. L. Bureau a Student Committee was set up, and with the approval of the Farmers' Committee a school strike was called in protest against the action of the School Board in not helping the farmers. We called it a "Foreclosure Holiday."

The strike was a success. Half of the students stayed out, including the overwhelming majority of the children from the

right-wing farmers. Three car-loads of state troopers came on the day of the strike, the same day on which we were preparing to leave for the county seat. The cops followed each bus around on its route, since a rumor spread that the farmers would take the buses by force. Of course the cops came in with the aim of intimidating the farmers. The rank and file Halonen supporters "persuaded" their leadership to give the co-op truck for transportation of the farmers.

Foreclosure Postponed for Five Years

We compelled the Delta County authorities to give five years time for N—— to pay for his farm. The county prosecuting attorney answered our committee that there will be no more forced foreclosures in the county. We made him understand that we do not trust the lawyers but are calling a meeting of all mortgaged farmers and a representative of the Federal Land Bank where they will definitely agree to stop foreclosures. And if not, we will organize a march to the county supervisors' meeting. They did not like it since they don't want to see 700 farmers camped on the court house steps.

This action raised the prestige of the Party and the "reds" generally and will help in winning over the rank and file farmers from the right-wing leadership. But the greatest difficulty is that only a few of the comrades are participating in these actions and giving leadership in these struggles.

A. B.

Safeguarding the Party Apparatus

ON a number of occasions the Central Committee brought to the attention of our Party the necessity of preserving the Party apparatus, that the work of the Party be organized in such a manner that during the times of mass actions and struggles of the masses, we will not leave the apparatus of the Party open to attack on the part of the government forces. This warning and advise of the Central Committee is not taken seriously. Constantly, in different parts of the country, one can see the reports to the contrary. Thanks to our negligence and disregard of the warning of the Central Committee, we are paying heavily.

In connection with May Day preparations, the *Daily Worker* of May 3rd reports the following:

"Pittsburgh, Pa., May 2.—Two hours before the demonstration, police swooped down on the Communist Party office

and arrested sixteen. Most of them leaders of the workers in this city. They are held incommunicado.

"Those known arrested are Lena Davis, District Organization Secretary of the Communist Party, Ben Careathers, Negro worker and an outstanding leader of the Pittsburgh workers, Phil Frankfeld, secretary of the Unemployed Councils, Ernest Careathers, Jack Stone, George Kutz, J. Romango, Mary Subina and J. Stark."

In this news report of the *Daily Worker*, two things stand out. 1) That the leaders of the Party and mass organizations in Pittsburgh, instead of being with the workers on May First, that is, in the neighborhoods, around the shops, in workers' halls to help mobilize and organize workers to march to the central demonstration, these leaders assembled in the Party office, *isolated* from the masses of employed and unemployed workers. 2) That by this they violated the second principle, namely, they placed themselves open to attack by the police.

It is well known that at every mass action the police aim to arrest recognized leaders of the masses for the purpose of crippling preparations and if possible, to prevent demonstrations by these acts. Different methods are used. In Chicago, bomb explosions occurred on May First and Communists were accused of being the ones who threw the bombs, for the purpose of intimidating masses, to frighten them and by this also to lay the basis for an attack.

In Pittsburgh, the police raided the office and very conveniently arrested the whole leadership because of the neglect on the part of the leaders. However, it would be wrong to single out Pittsburgh as the worst example in this respect. By no means is it the only example. I will enumerate a number of similar negligences and disregard of A. B. C. principles of Bolshevik work of our Party in this regard. Here are some additions to Pittsburgh.

During the preparations for the Illinois State Hunger March, the state authorities mobilized all their armed forces to break up the Hunger March and aimed to arrest leaders of the march. Our comrades in Illinois did the very same thing that our comrades in Pittsburgh did. Two days before the Hunger March, 9 organizers and leaders, and among them a member of the Central Committee, went to a dance hall and the police very conveniently arrested whom they wanted and prevented these organizers to work in mobilization of the workers for the Hunger March and to give guidance and leadership, therefore, to some extent crippling the work of the Hunger March.

In the State of X where farmers are stopping evictions and foreclosures of the farmers, comrades prepared a leaflet to the farmers

in a house of a well-known revolutionary worker. Four of them gathered to prepare the leaflet and also brought with them a complete list of farm connections. The police raided the house, confiscated the leaflets and the list of the farmers and arrested the comrades.

In a big industrial city, a member of the Central Committee, carrying very responsible work, was picked up on the streets by the police and in his pockets was a list of workers who are working in a very important industrial plant.

Some time ago, in the Illinois coal fields, in preparation for the August First anti-war demonstrations, the District Organizer made a final trip in checking up on preparations, and instructing comrades to "put aside" all important material and addresses the comrades had. It was quite obvious that the police prepared an attack. The comrades gathered every piece of material, every letter and every connection and wrapped it in a paper and left it in a place so that when the police raided, they had no difficulty in looking for the material. Everything was wrapped nicely in a paper and all communications were in the hands of the police.

In an important industrial city a strike took place recently. Our Party was engaged in the strike and was the leader in the strike. During the strike, in a house of a worker, a complete registration of the Party members and other workers was brought for mailing out some letters. The police raided the house, took possession of the registration list.

The above, by no means, is a complete list known to me of such negligence and the results of every such raid is well known. Workers are fired from their shops. Some are arrested, some charged with Criminal Syndicalism and others deported. One may ask a question, how much longer can we tolerate in our Party such an irresponsible attitude toward these organizational questions? How much longer will we permit through our negligence to give to the police names and addresses of workers in the shops, mines, members of the unions, etc.?

It is our opinion that an example of such negligence must be made, dramatizing before the whole Party a most strict account to be made on every such occasion. This, by the way, does not confine itself to the lower Party units and sections. It is also members of the Central Committee, District Committees, Section Committees, units, fractions—from the top down—everyone violates the very principle of Bolshevik organization. Such irresponsibility must be treated equally with the political irresponsibility against which our Party carries a vigorous struggle—expelling members of the Party

who violate political and theoretical principles of the Party. It is about time that our Party shall fight just as vigorously those in our ranks who violate the basic principle of the Bolshevik organization of our Party.

B. GEBERT

Agit-Prop Work

"Opportunistic capitulation means renouncing revolutionary agitation among the masses, it means giving ground before the petty bourgeois prejudices, illusions or temporary feelings of depression among the majority, it means hushing up, or glossing over the fundamental differences between Communism and reformism." (Kuusinen—Prepare for Power.)

What Was Wrong With Our May First Agitation

TO what extent has our agitation helped to develop the political consciousness of the workers and helped to rid them of petty bourgeois prejudices and reformist illusions? How has our agitation aided in enlightening the workers on the program and tactics of the Party as the leader of the day to day struggles, the organizer and leader of the decisive battles against capitalism? Is our agitation systematically educating the masses to an understanding of the principles of communism—the historical necessity of the dictatorship of the proletariat—the fundamental differences between Communism and reformism?

To carry through a "steady activity with a view to raising the class consciousness of the broadest masses" (Kuusinen) we must learn how to link up these specific issues, these partial demands and slogans, with propaganda for the principles of Communism. We have to learn how to combine an exposure of the economic conditions with an exposure of the broader political issues, tasks and slogans, with the aim of raising the understanding and political consciousness of the workers. It is necessary to carry through the most systematic propaganda and agitation to make accessible and comprehensible the program of the Party to large sections of workers.

Let us discuss these problems around the May First agitation. Here the Party was faced with several tasks. To unite the workers around the burning issues confronting them; to expose the anti-

working class character of the Roosevelt program, to bring forward an immediate program of struggle and to explain our revolutionary program as against the policies of the reformists.

Necessary to Explain Roosevelt Program

The Party could not merely repeat on this May First what it has been saying for years. It had to start on the most concrete issues—the issues brought forward in the Roosevelt program, show that the various measures of the administration will not bring, “American recovery,” will not alleviate the desperate situation of the masses. The blatant demagoguery accompanying every act of the Roosevelt administration necessitated the most specific and explicit detailed exposure on the part of the Party in every district. The Central Committee Manifesto for united action issued March 29th, made as its starting point the conditions of the masses under the Roosevelt administration and the general sharpening of the world situation. While many of the district leaflets make reference to the Roosevelt program, it does not permeate our agitation, dealing specifically with the promises made prior to the election and the actions today.

Take the Philadelphia united front call for May 1st. Under a sub-heading “We hoped—but are disappointed” (??) the call continues to say that “the new deal of Roosevelt is the same raw deal of Hoover” and then a few general remarks. The Roosevelt program is not the same as the Hoover deal. It is far more vicious, more intensive. To the masses it however, appears as a panacea which will bring about the turn. Precisely because it is couched in “prosperity” promises, does it require more detailed analysis to present these facts “as convincing, intelligible and as easy of assimilation as possible” (Lenin). But the “exposure” of the Philadelphia comrades only helps to strengthen the illusions and not to shatter them. The Party united front call from Chicago, a very good call, formulating a whole series of concrete demands among which we find “Against Roosevelt’s forced labor military camps,” but not a mention in the body of the call on the essence of the “new deal.” Many calls are merely a general reference to May First as a traditional day of struggle without dealing concretely with the present problems and tasks.

Party’s Agitation Cannot Merely Duplicate Merely United Front Demands

Throughout the country the Party participated in united front conferences. The Party endorsed the united front demands. But the participation of the Party in united front actions does not mean hiding the independent role of the Party. On the contrary, these actions should make possible reaching wider sections of the

toiling masses with the program of the Party and convince them on the basis of our leadership in the united front of the correctness of our policy. Instead, we find that the Party in many important centers lost itself in the united front and repeated only the general united front demands. Thus for instance the Party leaflet in Pittsburgh does not differ from the other leaflets. It does not explain the relation of the Party to the united front. It does not bring forward the central demands of the Party and does not even mention the slogan "For a Workers and Farmers Government."

Take the shop papers issued in Chicago. The *Stockyard Worker* has for its chief demand the release of the Scottsboro boys and Tom Mooney. The other shop papers have demands against wage cuts, war, etc., but none of the papers deal, if only briefly, on the Party. Only the leaflet issued by the comrades in Milwaukee analyses the Roosevelt program in some detail, brings forward the revolutionary way out of the crisis as the only working class solution, contrasting the building of socialism in the Soviet Union to decaying capitalism.

Must Not Blur Over Negro Question

In the South we have some of the crassest examples of glossing over the central programmatic demands of the Party. A whole series of leaflets were issued by the Southern comrades for May First. In the Party leaflet for May First, not only is there no mention of the struggles of the Negro masses, the role of the Party in the liberation movement of the Negro people, the tasks of the white toilers, but the sole demand which has even the term Negro in it reads: "For the right of the white workers and poor farmers and Negro masses to vote without payment of poll tax. For the right to sit on juries." There is no doubt that these are important issues in the South—issues which can arouse large sections of the Negro masses for action. But to make this the central demand of the Party in the South is to blur over the national issues of the Negro people and give concessions to white chauvinism within the ranks of the **white working class**.

The slogan for self-determination in the Black Belt is the central demand of the Party in the South. In our leaflets to the white workers this demand should have been explained in relation to their own problems, and show them why they must be in the forefront of the struggle for the rights of the Negroes if they are to liberate themselves from capitalist exploitation. The white workers of the South will never be won by toning down on the Negro question.

Unemployment Insurance—Central Demand

For the past four years the Party has led courageous battles for

unemployment relief and federal unemployment insurance at the expense of the government and employers. This should have been the central demand for May First. But it was not prominently explained in our agitation. Leaflet after leaflet completely forgets the struggle for unemployment insurance. Leaflets issued by unemployed council (Pittsburgh, etc.) call for action on May First for immediate relief. In California the demand reads: For cash relief, bonus and jobless insurance Bill No. 1910. Not a word in the leaflet nor in the demands for federal unemployment insurance. Many of the leaflets issued in the Chicago district, Pittsburgh, Ohio, etc., put forward the demand for unemployment insurance, but do not state at whose expense let alone explain the need for unemployment insurance and why the workers must unite to win this demand.

Roosevelt prior to his election promised "compulsory state unemployment insurance reserves based on sound insurance financing." He promised "generous federal unemployment relief." Every act of the administration has been directed to cut even the meager relief, to introduce forced labor projects and ignore the previous promises. The reformists — the A. F. of L. and the Socialist Party speak of unemployment insurance. Many so-called "progressives" mouth phrases about the need for unemployment insurance. Yet our leaflets assume that by some magic the workers will be able to differentiate between our demand for unemployment insurance and that made by the reactionaries.

Struggle Against War Weak Feature in Agitation

Or take the struggle against imperialist war and for the defense of the Soviet Union. We have emphasized on numerous occasions in directives, articles on various phases of agit-prop work, the need to deal concretely with the developing events which are heading the world towards war. But what is the character of our agitation. The same day in and day out—a repetition of the regular formula: "The capitalist class is preparing to plunge us into a new world war." How this is being done, what are the forces driving towards war, what factors exist which sharpen the present situation, to really alarm the workers on the imminence of war and the imperative need for struggle, that is entirely lacking. But leaflets that attempt to deal more concretely with the problem show a serious failure to follow regularly the editorials in the *Daily Worker*. The Canton leaflet speaks about the recent Roosevelt conference with various representatives of capitalist countries. It does not explain the purpose of these conferences, does not show the bitter antagonisms existing between the imperialist powers. But how does it explain why the Soviet Union was not invited. Quite simply. "They dare

not expose themselves to such an able spokesman for peace as Litvinov, Foreign Commissar of the Soviet Union." Not only does this not answer the struggle of world imperialism against the Soviet Union, nor explain the basis for the peace policy of the Soviet Union and the official pacifism of the American government under cover of which it is inaugurating a powerful armament construction program, but it does not convince the masses of workers of the real danger of an attack upon the Soviet Union and why they must defend the Soviet Union.

Fundamental Difference Between Communism and Reformism

We deal only with a few important problems. We raise these sharply because they emphasize in the most decisive manner the lack of seriousness with which the districts approach the question of Party agitation and propaganda. Leaflets are rushed out at the last minute—carelessly written, without a definite aim. No careful attention is given to investigate how our leaflets are received by the workers, whether they bring forward in a convincing manner the true facts, etc. This is especially necessary today in view of the "left" phrases used by the Socialist Party. We quote the following excerpts from a leaflet issued by the Socialist Party of Ohio for May First:

"Labor is challenged by the forces of capitalism. Labor must accept the challenge. On this May first, the day which labor all over the world has declared to be its own holiday, we must pledge ourselves to renewed service in the defense of the working class, and to concentrate and unite all our forces for the final struggle against the capitalist system which breeds fascism, unemployment and war."

How can workers differentiate between the above presentation of conditions and the struggle against capitalism and our position? How can they differentiate between these words and actions of the Socialist Party unless we explain clearly to the workers the "fundamental differences between communism and reformism" as it reflects itself even on the most elementary issues. It necessitates that we clearly explain to the workers how the working class can gain power, why it must struggle for power, and who leads them in the struggle for power. It must show to the workers what the dictatorship of the proletariat will mean for the working class of the United States and the oppressed toiling masses, showing the advances made by the Soviet Union. It requires a systematic exposure of the words and deeds of the reformists. Our agitation and propaganda does not as yet meet these tasks.

Propaganda alone will not win the masses for Communism. But propaganda can be an important force in convincing the workers on the basis of their own experiences that only the Communist Party can lead them in the struggle against capitalism.

B. G.

A Three-Day School Brings Good Results

THE school, recently held in the Ironwood Section School, was conducted in such a manner that all subjects taken up were mostly discussed by the students. The method of lecturing on the subject or the instructor answering all questions was replaced by the method of student discussion in question and answer form.

The subjects taken up were unemployed work, farming work, and shop work. Each subject was allowed an hour and 30 minutes. Besides this an hour and 30 minutes was spent for current events. One class was devoted to the Finnish Daily subscription drive for the Finnish comrades while the youth and other elements in the school held a class on the Young Communist League Plenum Resolution.

The First Day

In unemployed work we took up the structure of the Unemployed Council, how an unemployed group and committee is formed (to many of our comrades this was very unclear). A chart was used to clarify the comrades on this. Each comrade was given a copy to study. After a short talk by the instructor on this the students took the floor and asked questions and other students answered. The instructor then summarized the discussion answering those questions not clear to the student body.

The same was done in farming work—taking up the committee of actions and how we must proceed to organize those bodies—how to build the United Farmers League and our policy in other farm organizations. The subject was brought up by the instructor and the students then discussed from their own experiences in farm work and how they have organized committees of action.

The shop work was conducted in the same manner—building of shop groups, the National Miners Union. It was noticeable that the subject on shop work was the weakest because the comrades did not take part as enthusiastically in this discussion as in unemployed and farming work and had very little experiences to relate.

The Second Day

This day was spent mostly for general discussion on each subject. All comrades were asked to bring up any question they did not

understand or the instructor asked questions as to what the students would do if certain problems arose the students answering and asking questions.

For instance in farming work—we took up the beer question and how we should answer to workers who are misled by the propaganda that beer will bring back prosperity—what our policy should be towards the moratorium on debts and taxes, the Frazier Bill and other bills. How we should conduct meetings of workers and farmers, how we can keep those organizations that are organized by us from going into the hands of betrayers, how we must act at farmers' meetings, etc.

The Third Day

This day we organized dummy meetings.

Four comrades were picked out to organize a Committee of Action from the student body who acted as unorganized farmers. This committee of four planned out how they were going to proceed beforehand.

This committee planned to make a few blunders to see whether they would be noticed. It is our advice that this method should not be followed since quite a number of mistakes were made and the discussion on this took quite a long time.

After a committee of action was organized. The student body analyzed the shortcomings as well as the good points of this committee. After this the instructor summarized and brought out the points omitted and what should have been done.

The same was done in unemployed and shop work. Dummy meetings were held showing the organization of an unemployed committee and a shop committee.

Through this method, we found we were able to get even the most backward students to discuss. The discussion was always lively and full of interest and in the short time we were able to take up lot of problems and clarify the students on many questions. Some comrades were assigned to oppose the organizing of the committees of action. This pepped up the students in fighting back and learning how to fight any opposition that arises at meetings whether in the farming, unemployed or mining field.

In current events we took up May Day, Tom Mooney Conference and the Plenum Resolution of the Young Communist League. One class was held for Finnish comrades only on the Finnish Daily subscription drive.

Of the 110 students, most of the students were well satisfied and as a school for only three days, they said they learned a lot. Some said they learned more in the three days of this school than in three years in a capitalist school.